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1959] RECENT DECISIONS 1249 
REsTITUTION-PURCHASER'S REMEDIES WHERE REAL ESTATE BROKER 
FALSELY PURPORTS To BE OWNER'S AGENT AND MISREPRESENTS OWNER'S 
MINIMUM PRICE-Defendant, a licensed real estate broker, represented that 
he was exclusive agent for the sale of 72 acres of property. Plaintiff made 
him an offer to purchase at $4,000 per acre, but was later informed by de-
fendant that the owner had rejected the offer, insisting on at least $5,000 
per acre. Plaintiff then submitted an offer of $5,000 per acre, which de-
fendant subsequently indicated that the owner had accepted. The deal was 
consummated with most of the papers handled through a third party em-
ployee of defendant. Plaintiff subsequently learned that defendant had 
never been the agent of the owner, had never presented plaintiff's offers 
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to the owner, had misrepresented the minimum price of the property, and 
instead had purchased the property himself and resold it to plaintiff at a 
profit of $1,000 per acre. Plaintiff brought an action for damages in the 
superior court against defendant broker and the third party employee for 
violation of a fiduciary obligation. The superior court rendered judgment 
against both defendants for $72,049 compensatory damages, and awarded 
exemplary damages of $36,000 against defendant broker individually. The 
district court of appeal held that although the allegation of fiduciary rela-
tionship was not sustained by the evidence, plaintiff could still recover in 
quasi-contract due to defendant's unjust enrichment. The court accordingly 
struck out the award of exemplary damages, reversed the judgment as 
against the third party, and affirmed the judgment against defendant on 
the reduced amount.1 On rehearing, held, the cause should be reversed 
generally, one judge dissenting. No fiduciary relationship is created when a 
broker makes false representations to a buyer. But at the election of the 
defrauded party, a constructive trust may be imposed upon the wrongdoer 
based on unjust enrichment rather than tort. Since the plaintiff disavowed 
the theory of unjust enrichment, however, an affirmance of the judgment 
for the plaintiff upon that theory is not proper, though plaintiff will be 
given leave to amend his complaint. Ward v. Taggart, (Cal. App. 1958) 
329 P. (2d) 320. 
A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong at the expense 
of another.2 Accordingly, most cases hold a real estate broker liable where 
he not only misrepresents to the purchaser the owner's minimum price 
but also misrepresents himself to be the owner's agent.3 The purchaser's 
remedy may be in tort for deceit4 or breach of fiduciary obligation,5 
or in restitution under either a theory of quasi-contract6 or constructive 
trust.7 Since in the principal case the value of the land was not shown to 
be less than the price paid to the broker, the purchaser did not prove 
a pecuniary loss and the tort remedy of deceit was precluded.8 Recovery 
1 Ward v. Taggart, (Cal. App. 1958) 325 P. (2d) 502. 
2 REsTrrurION lu:sTATEMENT §3 (1937); DAWSON, UNJUsr ENRICHMENT 3 (1951). 
s See 55 AL.R. (2d) 342 at 374 (1957). Where the broker is in fact the agent of the 
owner and misrepresents the owner's minimum price to the purchaser, the cases are in 
conflict as to whether ·the purchaser can recover from the owner's broker. Id. at 357. 
4 Stevens v. Reilly, 56 Okla. 455, 156 P. 157 (1916); Isenbeck v. Burroughs, 21'7 Mass. 
53'7, 105 N.E. 595 (1914). 
5 Chung v. Johnston, 128 Cal. App. (2d) 157 at 164, 2'74 P. (2d) 922 (1954); Anderson 
v. Thacher, '76 Cal. App. (2d) 50, 172 P. (2d) 533 (1946). 
6 Briggs v. Rodriquez, (Tex. Civ. App. 195~) 236 S.W. (2d) 510; Clifford Banking Co. 
v. Donovan Commission Co., 195 Mo. 262 at 288, 94 S.W. 527 (1906). See also REsTrrunoN 
REsrATEMENT §§130 and 166, comment b, p. 674 (1937). 
7 Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A. (2d) 136 (1955); Teuscher v. Gragg, 136 
Okla. 129 at 133, 276 P. 753 (1929). See also REsTrrunoN REsrATEMENT §§160 and 166. 
8 Principal case at 322; PROSSER, TORTS 566 (1955); 3 TORTS RllsTATEMENT §§525 and 
549; McLennan v. Investment Exchange Co., 170 Mo. App. 389, 156 S.W. '730 (1913). 
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for breach of fiduciary obligation was properly denied, as courts generally 
refuse to find a fiduciary relationship between a real estate broker and a 
prospective client, where there is no principal-agent agreement.9 Thus 
plaintiff's recovery must be founded on a theory of restitution for unjust 
enrichment. Although the two principal restitutionary remedies of quasi-
contract and constructive trust10 closely resemble each other, the quasi-
contract remedy is more appropriate on the facts of the principal case 
since it is a legal remedy imposing personal liability upon the defendant 
to pay a sum of money, whereas the constructive trust is an equitable 
remedy generally employed for the recovery of specific property.11 In a 
quasi-contract action, however, the plaintiff must not only show that 
there was unjust enrichment of the defendant, but must usually establish 
that the defendant's enrichment was obtained at the expense of the plain-
tiff.12 As the plaintiff in the principal case presumably paid the defendant 
no more than the land was worth, it can be argued that the defendant's 
profit from the transaction was not obtained at the expense of the plain-
tiff. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if the defendant broker had ob-
served the canons of common honesty, the plaintiff could have obtained 
the property for about $70,000 less than he paid for it. Perhaps defendant's 
conduct could be regarded as a fraudulent interference with the expectation 
of a contract right, giving rise to a quasi-contract action in the same way 
that a defendant who fraudulently interferes with an expectation of a 
gift or other succession to property is held to be a constructive trustee 
for the intended donee.13 In any event, the fact that the unjustified gain 
came directly from the plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for 
restitution. To allow the defendant in the principal case to keep the 
9 -Morrish Estate, 156 Pa. 'Super. 394 at 400, 40 A. (2d) 907 (1945); 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES §482, p. 87 (1946; Supp. 1956). But see Stevens v. Reilly, note 4 supra; 
Greig v. Interstate Investment Co., 121 Ore. 15 at 21, 253 P. 877 (1927). It could be 
argued that an agent-principal relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant for 
the limited purpose of defendant's faithful transmission of communications to the 
seller. See note, 35 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 604 at 608 (1955). 
10 Note, 12 UNIV. CIN. L. R.Ev. 390 at 392 (1938). 
11 REsrrrUTION REsrATEMENT, §160, comment a (1937); WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS 
§3, p. 5 (1913); Barnes v. Eastern and Western Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553 at 597, 287 
P. (2d) 929 (1955). 
12 WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §274, p. 442 (1913); KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 163 
(1893); REsrrrunoN REsrATEMENT §I, comment e (1937). But see Federal Sugar Refin. Co. v. 
United States Sugar Equalization Board, (S.D. N.Y. 1920) 268 F. 575 at 582; comment, 
33 MICH. L. REv. 420 at 424 (1934). Sec. 2224 of the Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949), on 
which the court in the principal case based its decision, provides that "One who gains 
a thing by fraud • . . , or other wrongful act, is • . . an involuntary trustee of the 
thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would othern,ise have had it.'' Thus 
this provision retains the requirement that the defendant's enrichment must be at the 
expense of the plaintiff. 
13,Monach v. Koslowski, 322 Mass. 466, 78 N.E. (2d) 4 (1948); Brazil v. Silva, 181 
Cal. 490, 185 P. 174 (1919); REsTrrunoN REsTATEMENT §184 (1937). 
1252 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
profits of his chicanery would be to give an implicit sanction to dis-
honesty. It is clear that no party other than the plaintiff is entitled to 
these profits.14 Thus, permitting an award of defendant's profits to the 
plaintiff is justifiable from the standpoint of public policy15 and is 
within the broad outlines of restitutionary theory. 
I ohn W. Simpson 
14 Principal case at 324. Compare Harper v. Adametz, note 7 supra, whei;e in a 
similar situation the court allowed restitutionary relief even though it appeared that the 
defendant was the agent of the owner, who also might have had a claim against the 
defendant. See also Gilfillen v. Moorhead, 73 Conn. 710, 49 A. 196 (1901); note, 54 MICH. 
L. REv. 714 (1956). 
15 See Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312 at 338, 114 S.W. 979 (1908). A real estate broker's 
licensing statute has been held to impose upon the broker the duty to deal in good faith. 
Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 S. (2d) 4 (1946); Flugel v. Meek, 98 Ohio App. 218 at 223-224, 
128 N.E. (2d) 828 (1954). 
